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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICH~IOND. 
Record No. 1436 
CONTINENTAL LIFE INSURANCE CO :NIP ANY, Em-
ployer, AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COM-
pANY, Insurer, 
vs. 
J AlVIES S. GOUGH, Claimant. 
PETITION FOR A 'VRIT OF ERROR. 
'l'o the Honorable Chief Jttstice and Justices of the Suprerne 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, Continental Life Insurance Company 
·(Employer) and Aetna Life Insurance Company (carrier or 
insurer), respectfully show unto Your Honors that they are 
aggrieved by an award of the full Industrial Commission of 
;virginia (Nickels, Chairman, dissenting) dated August 4, 
1933, a\varding to J an1es S. Gough (claimant) compensation 
at the rate of fourteen ($14.00) dollars per week, beginning 
.J.a;nuary 17, 1933, payable every two weeks during· disability, 
··and in addition payment of the necessary medical, surgical 
and hospital attention, including the first sixty days, and not 
to exceed an additional one hundred eig·hty days, which award 
set aside the award of Nickels, Chairman, dat-ed l\fay 6, deny-
ing compensation to this claimant on the ground that the 
evidence indicated his accident did not arise out of and in 
the course of his mnploy1nent. 
• STATE~fENT OF FACTS. 
James S. Gough was mnployed as collector and agent of 
Continental Life Insurance Con1pany. On January 16, 1933, 
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he was making collections for his employer in the Great 
Bridge area, abqut ten ~iles from the City of Norfolk, in Nor-
folk County, Virginia. He started at Port~ock, Virginia, anti 
tnade collections from the Richmond Cedar Works through 
Great Bridge, down Jamestown Road- and back through what 
is known as the Elbow Road to Butt's Station. (R., p. 2.) He 
then paused to collect a premium from a l\tir. Doxey, who car-
ried insurance with the ~mployer on the life of his son, Clifton 
Doxey. While at the Doxey house Clifton Doxey and Earl 
Proctor, whose father also carried a policy with the employer 
on his son's life, asked the claimant to take them to a place 
called Oak Grove. In the words of the clahnant, these boys 
w·ere insured by their fathers, and he had no debit to collect 
from them, and he ''merely rode them down the road as an 
accommodation". (R., pp. 3 and 8.) The boys had explained 
to the claiinant that they intended to meet som·e people at 
Oak Grove, but upon arriving at that place the people were 
not there. The claimant thereupon discharged the boys at 
Oak Grove, and continued on his route to a ~fr. Gray's, ex-
plaining that he would pick them up when he returned to 
Oak Grove. The clain1ant called on l\lr. Gray, returned to 
Oak Grove, and at the boys' request picked them up and 
agreed to take them to Eagle Service Station near Great 
Bridge. (R., p. 4.) At this time the Doxey boy was sitting on 
the front seat and the Proctor boy on the rear seat. Before 
arriving at Eagle Service Station the claimant was assaulted 
with a hatchet by the ·boy on the rear seat, resulting in frac-
ture of the skull and other cuts and bruises. (R., p. 5.) At 
tho time of the accident the c~aimant was operating a Model 
''A'' Ford, ownership of which is not disclosed by the Rec-
ord (page 6). However, it will not be denied that the clainl-
ant owned the automobile and was allowed a certain sun1 per 
week by his employer for its operation. Evidence as to the 
faets attending the assault was given solely by the claimant 
and is not disputed. Because of the unique facts presented, 
the insurer concluded to present the case to the Industrial 
Commission of Virginia for its decision on an agreed sfate-
ment of facts. That such was the insurer's intention is clearly 
shown by the record, page 2 : · 
'' Chairman NI Cl{ELS : 
''Note: It. is agreed that the average weekly wage was 
$51.00. 
"This ease is ub1nitted upon an agreement of facts, as fol-
low~, viz.: 
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(After some discussion among the counsel for the respec-
tive parties and the Con1missioner presiding, it was decided to 
allow the claimant and oth-ers to testify, and the case be de-
cided upon the record thus submitted.-Stenog. Note.) '' 
Since the evidence at the hearing before Commissioner 
Nickels conformed to the facts revealed by the investigation 
of the insurer, no evidence was adduced on behalf of the de-
fendants. Upon the evidence thus given Chairman Nickels 
dismissed th-e claim on the ground that no motive was estab-
lished to explain the assault, and that the hazard or risk in-
curred under the circumstances wer~ -those emanating from 
positive action on the part of the claimant in granting a favor 
to the assailants. ·Claimant's counsel fil-ed an application for 
a rehearing or revie-w, accompanied by an affidavit of A. 0. 
Lynch, Commonwealth's Attorney for Norfolk County. The 
basis for the application for a rehearing was the alleged dis-
covery of after-discovered evidence as to the motive of the as-
sault, which was revealed at the trial of Proctor and Doxey 
in the Circuit Court of Norfolk County on April 27, 1933, on 
charges of maiming and attempted robbery. Attempting to 
excuse the failure to introduce this -evidence at the original 
hearing before Chair1nan Nickels on April 17th, the petition 
states: 
''The Commission is well aware of the fact that the assail-
ants could not have been mad-e to testify at the hearing be-
cause, under law, they could not be forced to give testimony 
against themselves.'' (R., p. 27.) 
The affidavit of A. 0. Lynch sets forth briefly, that the mo-
tive for the assault on the c!aimant· by Proctor and Dox-ey, as 
shown by the evidence given at their trials on April 27th in 
the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, was to take from Mr. 
Gough his automobile in order that they might take some 
girls for a ride. (R., pp. 29, 30, 31.) 
In opposition to claimant's motion for a new trial the in-
surer, by its adjuster and agent, E. M. Parrish, made and 
filed an affidavit which, in substance, stated that on or about 
February 1, 1933, E. G. Farley, adjuster of Aetna ·Life In-
;::;ura·nce Company, interviewed Proctor and Doxey at the jail 
of tlie Circuit Court of Norfolk County, and discussed with 
thmn the circumstances attending· the assault upon the claim-
ant on the 16th of January, and that the boys admitted the 
motive of the assault was .to take the claimant '"s car; that he 
was present at the hearing held before Chairman Nickels 
,.~ -~--~---- --~--- --~---~- ~----
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on April 17th, 1933, in the City of Norfolk, and that claimant 
or his counsel did not state to the Industrial Oommission 
that they desired to prove the motive for the assault, nor did 
they request a continuance of the hearing until such time as 
they 'vould be in a position to compel the said assailants to 
testify as to their motive; that the assailants were not sum-
moned as witnes~es to testify on behalf of the claimant, and 
that it did not appear in the record that they had claimed their 
privilege of not giving testimony against themselves at the 
said hearing. The full Cotnmission refused claimant's appli-
cation for a rehearing·, but on the review of the evidence 
before it reversed the ·opinion of Chairman Nickels and 
a'varded compensation to the c1ain1ant. The opinion of the 
majority of the~ Commission by Deans, Commissioner, l{izer, 
Comrrtissioner, concurring, and Nickels, Chairman, dissenting, 
contained some astounding findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on the undisputed evidence in the case, and expresses 
aspersions entirely unjustified by the facts of the case on 
the persons responsible for the defense of the case on be-
half of the insurer, and even against the dissenting Commis-
sioner, reference to which will be made in the assignments of 
error. 
ASSIGN~fENTS OF ER.ROR. 
1. The Cornmisslon erred in holding that the accident arose 
out of the employment, since there was no evidence to sup-
·port it. 
2. The Commission erred in incorporating the Employer's 
First Report of .... 1\ccident in the record, since it was not made 
a part of the record at the original hearing. 
3. The Commission erred in holding that statements ob-
tained by an insurer in the course of its investigation should, 
in any event, be introduced in evidence at a hearing on the 
claim investigated. 
4. The Commission erred in holding that the claim was de-
fended by the carrier 'vithout reasonable grounds. 
ARGU~1:ENT ON ASSIGN~IENTS OF ERROR. 
I. The Commission Erred in Holding That the Accident 
arose out of the Employment, Since there Was no Evidence to 
Support it. 
Section 2(d) of the \Vorkn1en's Compensation Law of Vir-
ginia provides as follows : 
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. J. S. Gough. 5 
'' 'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall n1ean only injury by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, 
and shall not inc!ude a disease in any form, except wher-e it 
results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.' '' 
It is well established by the decisions of the Industrial 
Commission and of this Court that before a claimant can re-
cov-er he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he has suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of 
-his employment. C·rews vs. lJti osely Bros., 148 Va. 125; 138 
S. E. 494. The only evidence before the C01nmission frorn 
'vhich it could determine whether the claimant had sustained 
the burden of proof was that given at the hearing before 
Chairman Nickels. In its eagerness to criticize persons 
charged with the insurer's def-ense of this claim the Commis-
sion adopts as some of its :finding·s of fact statements con-
tained in the affidavit and counter-affidavit filed in connec-
tion with the application for a rehearing, which, in our opin-
ion, was obviously in1proper, since the application was re-
fused. This assignm-ent presents the sole question: Does au 
assault on an insurance agent and collector by two persons 
'vhose lives are insured by his employer, and who are being 
ridden as an accommodatio~ to them, constitute an accident 
arising out of the en1ployn1ent, where the evidence fails to dis-
close the nwtive for the assault? 
The findings of fact on which the Con1mission bases its 
award are thus briefly stated: _ 
''Ther-e was no animosity between the claimant and the as-
sailants upon which conj-ecture could be placed that the as-
sault was for the purpose of revenge, and the natural con-
clusion follows that it \vas a genuine holdup or assault for the 
purpose of taking either the automobile or the money on the 
claimant's person. Any other conclus~on would be surmise 
or conjecture, and would place a most strict interpretation 
upon the provisions of the requiren1ents of the W orkrnen 's 
Compensation Act, when the Courts have admonished the 
Connnission that the Con1pensation Act is highly ren1edial 
and should he liberally construed to effect its bencficieut pur-
pose." (R., pp. 40, 41.) 
There is no prop-er evidence in the record on which this 
finding of fact could be n1ade. The facts briefly are that as an 
accom1nodation to Proctor and Doxey the claimant agTeed to 
ride them down the road, and while so riding then1 he was 
--~ ---~~~~~~-~~--~ 
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assaulted by these two boys. It apparently did not occur to 
claimant's counsel to attempt to prove the motive for the as-
sault at the original hearing·. That such was necessary was 
obviously an after-thought suggested by Chairman Nickels' 
opinion dated 1\fay 6. In our view of the case the assault re-
sulted from a self-created hazard, not necessary or incidental 
to the employment. This principle of. law was well stated in 
the case of Bu,tler vs. Wyman (Cal.), 18 P. 354, which held 
that an employee's injuries, to be within the Compensation 
Act, must be received while performing a duty he was em-
ployed to perform as one of the risks connected with the em-
ployment flowing therefrom as a natural consequence and di-
rectly connected with the work. The burden of proof was on 
the claimant to show that the riding of these two bqys was in-
cidental to his employment. Having introduced no evidence 
at all on this matter, it must follow that he has failed to sus-
tain this burden. The Commission seemed oblivous of this 
principle of la\\r in stating that "no evidence was introduced 
by the defendants to indicate that the employee was pro-
hibited from giving rides in his car to those not in the com-
pany's employ". (R·., p. 55.) It has a great deal to say 
about the reasonableness of the claimant's action in giving 
these two boys a ride. It is a matter of common knowledge 
that assaults and robberies very often occur as a result of 
picking· up hitch-hikers. This fact was so well recognized by 
our Legislature that in 19~2 it enacted a statute making jt 
unlawful to solicit rides on the highways. That the claimant 
slightly knew these boys did not minimize his chance of· be-
ing attacked, as 'vas shown by the facts. 
Whi!e we cannot adhere to the view that the accommoda-
tion extended to these ·boys was incidental to the claimant's 
employm~nt, even if we admit that it was, he bas still failed 
to sustain the burden of proof of showing that the assault 
arose out of the employment. The evidence reveals only ~u 
unexplained· assault .. As stated by Chairman Nickels, "The 
fact that no motive appears renders it impossible to formu-
late any conclusion re!ating to the cause for the assault. Any 
effort to fathom the depths of this essential inquiry leads us 
into the field of surmise and conjecture. The record is silent 
· in furnishing a scintilla of evidence, be it factual or circum-
stantial, in reference to the res gestate." 
The burden of proving· the cause of the assault was upon 
the claimant, and having failed to introduce any evidence 
direct or circumstantial to explain the assault, any conclusion 
drawn from the facts must be based upon surmise. In the 
case of Cre'Ws vs. Mosely Bros., su.pra, this Court said: 
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''While it is always the endeavor of the Court to construe ' 
the Compensation Statute liberally, in order to carry out 
its benevolent purpose, it must not be overlooked that lia-
bility cannot rest upon imagination, speculation, or conjec-
ture, but must be based upon facts established by the evi-
dence, and so found by the Commission. U. 8;. Fuel Co. vs. 
Ind. Corn., 310 Ill. 85, 141 N. :EJ. 401_." 
The evidence does not disclose whether the assault was 
purely personal to the claimant or whether it was committed 
to obtain property belonging to the e~p.ployer. In the ab-
f?ence of evidence, it is just as probable that it occurred for 
one reason as for the other, in which case the claimant has 
again failed to sustain the burden of proof. To relieve the 
claimant of this burden, and to excuse his failure to intro-
duce evidence as to the motive at the original hearing, the 
opinion of the Commission states : 
"The evidence of Parrish corroborates, in its entirety, the 
information contained in the petition of the claimant, and 
should be taken as an admission of all facts which could be 
produced at a further hearing to ~stablish a motive for the 
· assault.'' 
It should be borne in mind that the Commission refused 
the claimant's petition for- a rehearing to take additional 
testimony, and that the affidavit, not the evidence, of Par-
rish, should form no part of the record on which the Corn-
mission bases its findings of fact. It, of course, is appar-
ent, after reading the affid~vit of Lynch and Parrish, that 
the motive of the assault was robbery of Gough's car for 
the purpose of taking some girls for a ride, but in resorting 
to these affidavits the Commission went out of the record 
to obtain evidence in which to base its findings of fact. 
Our view of this case is that the evidence discloses an 
unexplained assault. The Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia and the overwhelming weight of authority i~ other ju-
risdiction had held that where no motive of an assault ap-
pears the injury does not arise out of the employment. Iu 
other words, to express it affirmatively, unless a causal con-
nection between the assault and en1ployment is shown, the 
injury is not compensable. Wagoner vs. Fr·uit Co., 12 0. 
·r. C~ 503; Jersey Ice Crean~ Co. vs. Ind.· Com., 309 Ill. 187; 
140 N. E. 862. In the latter case a worker in an ice factory 
was shot and killed by intruders. No loss of his personal 
effects or of company property occurred. No robbery was 
shown nor a motive therefor, and compensation was denied. 
-. 
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As- in the instant case; there was simply an unexplained as· 
sault. 
In cases in which it is shown that robbery is the n1otive 
of the assault it is our understanding of the law that unless 
robbery of the employer's property occurs, or is the motive, 
the injury is not compensab~€. If the n1otive of the robbery 
is to obtain the personal effects of the employee, then the as-
sault becomes personal to the en1ployee and is in no manner 
connected with the employinent, and injuries resulting there-
·from are not compeJ.?.sable. This principle was well expressed 
in the case of Brydon vs. lnd~tstrial Accident Cornm/issio,n 
(Cal.), 215 P. 1035. In this case a highwayman attacked the 
d~ceased while he was resting in a dog-house in performance 
·of his duties, or waiting to perform them, took a sum of 
money from his body, and departed without disturbing any-
thing on employer's premis€s. The Commission denied cmn-
pensation, and in.affirming the award, the Court said: 
"It is evident from the facts that the assault was purely per-
sonal to him and was not engendered because of any desire 
on the part of the n1arauders to molest the property of peti-
tioner's employer. The assault was but the case of an ordi-
nary hold-up, and so far as the liability of the employer to 
pay compensation is concerned, it mig·ht as 'veil have occurred 
on the road to the doghouse or out in the open country, or on 
the streets of the nearest city. The criminals were after the 
contents of petitioner's pockets, nothing more; and when they 
had taken what he had, they decan1ped. Petitioner was not 
entitled to compensation.'' 
In the case of Schnoll·vs. Brewing Co., 89 N.J. 150; 97 Atl. 
723, the claimant was a collector for a brewing company, and 
was killed while on his route. Nothing was taken from him, 
and no motive was shown for the assault, resulting in his 
death. Compensation was accordingly denied. 
While the facts in the case of 8 choltzha'lter vs. D. & L. Lunch 
Co., 233 N. Y. 12; 134 N. E. 701, are different from those in 
the instant case, the principle expressed therein is well stated, 
and should . be applied in the case at bar. In that case a 
'vaitress engaged in her work was shot and killed by a co-em-
ployee, a negro, because she had declined an invitation to go 
out with him. The Court held that the murder, 'vhile it arose 
in the course of the emploYJnent, did not arise out of it, and 
said in part : 
''An award cannot be made where the accident results froiu 
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exposed, and comn1on with all mankind, rather than as an 
employee. '' 
It is our contention that any person operating an automo-
bile on the highway, who picks up persons soliciting rides, 
may subject himself to an assault; in which case it cannot- be 
said that the risk was incidental to the employment. 
In the case of Walther vs. A1nerican Paper Co., 89 N. J. 
L. 732; 99 Atl. 263, the clain1ant, a night watchman, was 
killed in tl1e plant he was watching by a fello"r workman, who 
was not supposed to be in the plant, for the purpose of rob-
bing him of his personal n1oney. Compensation was denied 
despite the fact that the injury was sustained in the course 
of the employment, on the ground that, since the motive was 
the robbery of the 'vatchman himself, as distinguished frorn 
the robbery of the plant, the injury did not arise out of the 
emp~oyrnent. In New Jersey, as in Virginia, an injury has to 
result from an accident arising out of and in the course of the 
ernploy;rnent. Under the ruling, as laid down in this case and 
all of the cases which we have been able to find on the subject, 
even if the evidence had shown that the motive for the as-
sault on the claimant was tlw robbery of his car, the case 
still would not be compensable. 
The difficulty in arriving at a proper decision in this case 
1nay be briefly described as follows: At the original hear-
ing of this case the claimant evidently thought that because 
he had been assaulted during 'vorking hours he was entitled 
to cotnpensation. With this thoug·ht obviously in mind, no 
real attempt was Inade to introduce evidence to explain the 
assault. Upon receipt of an adverse award an attempt was 
·nmcle to reopen the case and introduce evidence suggested by 
·the Hearing Cornn1issioner. It seemed apparent to the Com-
nlission on revie'v that due diligence had not been used to ob-
tain this evidence, and the application for a rehearing· to in-
troduce this additional evidence was properly denied. The 
Con1mission is no'v seeking· to justify an award to the clainl-
aut on evidence which just <l~ws not exist. There 'vas not a 
scintilla of evidence supporting the Comn1ission 's findiu~s 
of fact that the accident arose out of the employment, and 
this Honorable Court is. respectfully requested to reverse it. 
II. The Conunissiou Erred in Incorporating the Employ-
er's First Repo1·t of Accident in the Record, Since it. Was 
not ~lade a Part of the Record at the Original Hearing. 
It so happens in this case that the Con1mission 's refer-
ence (R-., p. 36) to the Employer's First Report of .Accident, 
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dated January 28, is of little practical importance in this case. 
We assume it was referred to in the nature of an admission 
against interest. If such was the case, the defendant should 
have been afforded an opportunity to introduce relevant evi-
dence in rebuttal thereof. vVe believe it to be a dangerous 
precedent to sanction the use by the Commission of informa-
tion in its fi!e, when the subject matter thereof was not in 
issue at the hearing. Inasmuch as ~ir. Long, the district man-
ager for the employer, 'vas present at the hearing, and was 
not called by either party to testify, and no reference was 
made at the hearing to the report of accident, we believe the 
action of the Commission in incorporating the contents of the 
First Report in its opinion was error. The dangers inhering 
in this practice are too obvious to need further elaboration. 
III. The Commission Erred in Holding that Statements Ob-
tained by an Insurer in the Course of its Investigation Should 
in Any Event, be Introduced in Evidence at a Hearing on 
the Claim Investigated .. 
IV. The Commission Erred in Holding that the Claim Was 
Defended by the Carrier Without Reasonable Grounds. 
Th~se assignments will be discussed together, since they 
are so closely allied i~ the development of this claim. While 
the Commission does not expressly state that it is adopting 
this rule, the findings of facts and conclusions therefrom are 
tantamount to such a holding. Such findings of facts and 
conclusions pertinent to this discussion are : 
''The employer's insurance carrier has taken the position 
iri this case that the accident did not arise out of the employ-
Inent, but it will be shown later that it had within its pos-
session definite knowledge of the facts which conclusively es-
tablished the motive; and 'vhich made this claim one arising 
out of the employment, even by the strictest interpretation.'' 
(R., p. 42.) · 
''This is the first case that the Commission has had before 
it where a full disclosure of facts has not been made by the 
carrier or representative, although such facts would clearly 
warrant the payment of compensation and medical benefits.'' 
(R., p. 48.) 
''And while this case is one which was defended by the 
carrier without reasonable ground, inasmuch as it had within 
its possession facts showing the motive of the assault, and 
should know that such facts would bring the claimant within 
the provisions of the Compensation Act, Section 63 will not be 
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invoked in this case, but shall be used only as a warning in 
future ca_ses." (R., pp. 49, 50.) 
We consider the above statements unjust reflection on the 
good faith and integTity of the Aetna Life Insurance Com· 
pany and its adjusters, this law firm, who represented the 
company at the review before the full Commission, and in-
directly on Chairman Nickels. Inasmuch as a discussion of 
these assignments has no substantial bearing on the claim-
ant's right to recover in this case, in fairness to all persons 
on the losing side we feel that we are entitled to take the lib-
erty to go outside of the record and explain the actions of 
those persons charged with. the defense of this claim. 
This cas~ was investigated by E. G. Farley, the Norfolk 
adjuster of Aetna Life Insurance Company. His reports of 
investigation were forwarded to the Richmond office of the in-
surer, which determines whether a case will be accepted or 
contested. E. ~L Parrish, an adjuster for the insurer in the 
Richmond office, revie,ved the reports of investigation and 
felt a justifiable doubt as to the compensability of the case. 
No case involving similar facts has been passed upon by the 
Industrial Commission of Virginia or this Honorable Court, 
and E. M. Parrish's view of the case was that since- the in-
jury resulted from a risk or hazard, which was created by the 
claimant, the case was not compensable. As this Court is 
doubtless aware, this case and, we might add, the vast ma-
jority of cases before the Industrial Commission, are handled 
by adjusters of the carriers, who are trained in their par-
ticular line of work, but w·ho rarely are practicing attorneys, 
and for that reason the he·arings do not have the formality 
which is present in a Court of record. 
However, before advising the Commission that his com-
pany would contest the claim, E. M. Parrish, on or about Feb-
ruary 1st, informally discussed the matter with Commis-
sioner Kizer at the Industrial Commission, who suggested 
that the insurer allow·the Commission to decide whether the 
case was compensable or not. Following this discussion, 
on February 7, 1933, the insurer wrote the Industrial Commis-
sion the following letter: 
''Richmond, N'irginia, 
February 7, 1933. 
Industrial Commission of Virginia, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Gentlemen: 
There is some doubt in our minds as to whether or not 
this case is covered under the Workmen's Compensation 
--------------
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Laws of the State of Virginia. We will, therefore, respect-· 
fully request that you place this claim on your hea.ring docket 
to determine whether or not it is compensable .. Claimant is 
at the present tin1e confined to the hospital and unable to at-
tend the hearing. We will advise you as soon as he is able 
to attend the hearing, and if it is agreeable with him, and 
will expedite matters any, we should be very g·lad to have 
him appear personally before the Industrial Contmission in 
Richmond, 'vhere his evidence may be taken on which .we be-




. Very truly yours, 
C. H. DUFF, Adjuster. 
By E. M. PAR-RISH. 
Washington, D. ·c. Branch 
Norfolk Branch Office 
Assured'' 
It is reasonably apparent from this letter that this adjuster 
believed the only evidence necessary for the Commission to 
hear was the testimony of the claimant and that he did not 
consider the motive of the assault particularly material. This 
is also apparent from the statement on page 2 of the record, 
where it appears that the parties were .willing to submit the 
case upon an agreement of facts .. Whether this evidence was 
material is, of course, for this Court to decide. But, we may 
point out at this . time that the claimant was represented at 
the hearing by an attorney, who did not consider it material, 
·and the majority opinion of the Commission, by rejecting the 
application for a rehearing to introduce this evidence, has 
decided the case in favor of the claimant without a scintilla 
of evidence as to the motive. · 
Claimant rested. his case after giving his o·wn evidence _and 
taking that of his attending physician. It see1ned apparent 
to the adjusters present at the hearing, and to Chairman Nick-
els, that the claimant had not sustained the burden of proof 
by showing that· he suffered an accident arising· out of the 
employment, and they did not put on any evidence for the 
defendants. It is at this point that the majority of the Com-
mission has held that the insurer should have offered in evi-
dence the statem~nt of Proctor and. Dqxey. We fran"Kly con-
fess that we are unable to follow the reasoning of the C~m-
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mission in arriving at this conclusion. In the first place, it 
would have been hearsay evidence, and, in our vie'v of the 
case, inadmissible for that reason. "\Vhile under some cir-
cumstances hearsay evidence is admissible before the Com-
mission, we do not think that princip~e can be extended so 
as to allow ea; parte statmnents of persons not present at the 
hearing to be introduced. Such a statmnent has no guaranty 
of authenticity, and places the opposing party at a hopeless 
disadvantage if he should desire to discredit statements cou-
tained therein. Let us assun1e, for instance, that the state-
nlents of these boys would have shown that they assaulted 
the claimant for personal reasons under such circumstances 
as would not have entitled the claimant to compensation. It 
is inconceivable that, upon offering such statements in evi-
dence over the objection of counsel for the claimant, the Hear-
ing Commissioner would have admitted them, without an op-
portunity to cross-examine the authors of the statements so 
as to discredit, if possible, tlieir evidence. In our view of 
the law 've think it would have been obvious error to have 
admitted the statements under such circumstances. 
Another result of requiring such state1nent.s to be 1ntro-
duced in evidence is, in effect, to shift the burden of proof 
from the clahnant to the defendant to prove the claimant's 
case. In the following· language, in the opinion of the rna-
. jority of the Con1mission, it seems apparent that it does not 
regard very seriously the question of burden of proof. 
''The question of burden of proof has been battered about 
to a. great extent, and now appears to be placed on the claim-
ant to prove that he sustained accidental injuries arising out 
of and in the course of the employment." (R., pp. 4:2, 43.) 
We are not familiar with any cases in this State which 
have ever held otherwise, and think it is hardly necessary to 
point out that in all cases decided by this Court, where the 
question has been discussed, it has been held that th~ burden 
of proof is on the claimant. Hearings before the Industrial 
Comn1ission are in the nature of judicial -proceedings, and 
've know of no law or principle which would have required 
the defendant,· insurer, to offer in evidence hearsay state-
- n1ents, particularly when its representatives w·ere of the opin-
ion that the evidenee, introduced on behalf of the claimant, 
had _wholly failed to show an accident arising out of and 
in the course of the en1ployn1ent. And further, on page 45 of 
the record, we find the following statement: 
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''It is singular that interposing the reopening of the clairu 
on the ground of additional or after-discovered evidence, a 
representative of the Aetna Life Insurance Company should 
submit an affidavit indicating that this information was avail-
ab~e, and that he himself had such information within his pos-
session, prior to the hearing, but did not disclose same at the 
hearing.'' 
It seems to us that if there was any singular action in fail-
ing to introduce evidence as to the motive at the hearing 
before Commissioner Nickels, it was the action of the claim-
ant, on whom rested the burden of proof of showing the causal 
connection between the assault and his employment. If an . . 1 
adjuster or an attorney is willing to· take the responsibility.in 
the prote~tion of his client's interest, and refuses to introduce 
any evidence, it is certainly not our understanding that such 
adjuster or attorney is guilty of unethical practice in so do-
ing. The situation arises almost daily in Courts of record in 
this State when a motion is made to strike out the plaintiff's 
evidence. We believe it is true that in certain cases where 
'ilUch a motion should be sustained, if, instead of making the 
motion at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the defend-
ant went forward with his evidence, a jury question would, in 
many cases, be presented. If, however, such a motion were 
n1ade at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence and sus-
tained, 've do not understand that the defendant's attorney 
would be subject to criticism for withholding evidence. If 
such were the procedure before the Industrial Commission, 
a motion to strike out the claimant's evidence could hav-e 
been made when he rested his case, and, in our view of the 
law, should have ·been sustained. 
We are unable to understand the attitude of the Commis-
sion to the carrier and its adjusters in this case. In addition 
to the above quotations from the opinion of the majority of 
the Commission, we refer to page 51 of the record where it 
is said: · 
"It is anticipated that in the future the carrier may raise 
the question that there is a pre-existing condition of infection 
of teeth, or other unknown complaints,. which is the cause of 
disability, and will use this in an effort to be relieved of fur-
ther compensation liability." (Italics supplied.) 
We challenge the Commission, or anyone else, to cite an 
instance wherein this carrier, or its adjusters involved in 
this case, has attempted to be relieved of further con1pensation 
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• liability because of some unknown complaint. We have rep-
resented the Aetna Life Insurance Company for almost fif-
teen years in this locality, and no such instance has come to 
our attention. A sl~ort while before this case was argued 
before the Commission, the Commissioners composing the 
majority in. this opinion voluntary expressed commendation 
o£ this company and its adjuster for fair dealings before the 
Commission. The only conclusion that we can draw from 
these statements is that some prejudice has crept into this 
case, which we are unable to explain. · 
Before expressing these prejudices it would seem that re-
gard for the dignity of the Commission in administering the 
Workmen's Compensation Law, and particularly for the po-
sition of Chairman Nickels in this case, would have dictated a 
more moderate expression of opinion. After reviewing the 
entire record Chairman Nickels has seen fit to express a dis-
. senting opinion. Whether correctly or not, it is not for us to 
determine, but the inference of the oph;tion of the majority 
of the Conimission is that Chairman Nickels has expressed 
an opinion without any foundation of fact or law. It, of 
course, follows, that if the insurer defended this claim with-
out any reasonable ground, then there can be no reasonable 
ground for Chairman Nickels' opinion. -It seems to us tha.t 
the creation of such an impression would necessarily serve to 
bring the administration of the Compensation Law into disre-
pute. It seems to us an unhappy time for the majority of 
·the Commission to adopt such an intolerant attitude toward 
the opinion of one· of its Commissioners, whom we know to 
be regarded very highly for his work on the Commission, par-
ticularly when it seems that the country at large is about to 
emerg·e from one of the most intolerant periods in its history. 
The opinions of the Indust~ial Commission are published 
in advance sheet forms, and widely distributed and read over 
this State and in other jurisdictions. We see no reason to 
believe that this case occupies any different status from other 
cases, which are being contested daily before the Commis-
sion. There are serious, and, we believe, unjustified re-
flections on all persons connected with the losing side of this 
case, and if for no oth~r reason, we respectfully request this 
Honorable Court to revie'v this case and correct those im-
pressions which shortly will be widely distributed. 
CONCLUSION. 
This case involves facts, the proper determination of which 
is not so simple as is expressed in the majority opinion of 
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the Commission. It is interesting to note that, while the Com-
mission has held that this case is obviously compensable and 
should not even have been contested, the authorities cited in 
support of its opinion do not bear the slightest resemblance 
to the facts· in the instant case. 
The McNichols case involved an assault by an obviously in-
toxicated fellow-workn1en, who wa·s known by the employer 
as· an habitual, quarrelsome and dangerous drunkard. It 
was held that there 'vas a causal connection between the injury 
.and the conditions under which the claimant was required to 
work, since the injury was found to be the natural result of 
the employment of a peaceable workman with a choleric 
drunkard. 
The facts in the Standard Oil Co. vs. Clark case are set 
. forth in the opinion of the Comn1ission on pages 54 and 55 of 
the record, reference to which· will show not the slightest 
similarity to the case at bar. The weight of authority we be-
lieve supports our contention that, assuming· the motive of 
the assault was robbery of the clannant 's car, the case is still 
not compensable. That is the most favorable case that the 
claimant can 1nake out upon a consideration of the entire rec-
ord. The Commission adopted the view that the only evidence 
before it was that given at the hearing before Chairman Nick-
. els, since it refused the application for a rehearing. Upon 
the consideration of this evidence alone, it is our view that 
there is not the slightest foundation for an award in favor 
of the claimant. 
The case of 11·tdustrial Co'ln'ntission of Colorado, et al., vs. 
P'lteblo A.~ttom,obile Co., et al., 71 Colo. 424; 207 P. 479, is the 
most favorable case to the claimant's contention that 've have 
found, but is clearly distinguishable therefrom. In this case 
the employee, Elton C. Parks, out of whose death a claim for 
compensation aro~e-
"was in the employ of Pueblo Auto Company as a salesman. 
On April11J 1919, Parks went in an automobile into the. coun-
try for the purpose of selling an automQbile. On the trip he 
effected a sale to one Hunter, who started in the car with Parks 
on his return to Pueblo.'' 
''On the road they invited two brothers, named Bosco, to 
ride with them. A little later, while on the road, one of the 
Boscos shot and killed Parks. It appears that the killing was 
for the purpose of obtaining the automobile in which the 
parties were riding.'' 
In reversing· the judgment of the District Court vacating 
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the findings and award of the Commission in favor of the 
claimant, the Court said: 
"While it has been stated that these laws (Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts) cov-er only dangers which might have been an-
ticipated, yet the cases generally hold that if, after the injury, 
it can be seen that the injury was incurred because of the 
employment, it need not be such as to have been anticipated. 
We think that is the better rule.',. 
'~The award of the Commission can be sustained only on 
the ground that Parks lost his life while he was in the course 
of his employment, and as a r-esult of an attempt upon the 
part of the Boscos to obtain possession of the entployer's au-
tomobile." (Italics supplied.) 
This case eXJ)resses the principle which has been adopted by 
us as the test of compensability in such cases, that is : 
''If, after the injury, it can be seen that the injury was in-
curred because of the employment, it need not be such as to 
have been. anticipated." 
There was no occasion in this case to distinguish belween 
personal assault and assault arising· out of the employrl.lent, 
since it seems to have been admitted that the motive of the 
assault was robbery of the em.ployer' s automobile. We have 
already attempted to show this distinction in the cases, and 
need not comnwnt on it further at this time. In this case the 
Court does not consider the point which we are herein raising 
that the risk was created by the claimant himself, and was not 
incidental to the en1p!oyment. It should also be pointed out 
that this was a three-to-two decision, two of the Justices not 
participating. 
But even if this Honorable Court believes that the award 
of compensation to the claimant is proper, we respectfully re-
quest that a review of this case be had to correct the un-
fair inferences and accusations set forth under Assignments 
3 and 4. 
Your.petitioners aver that compensation, which has already 
accrued under the award of the Commission, exceeds the sum 
of $300.00, and that in addition thereto there are substantial 
medical bills ordered to be paid by the insurer, and that these 
sums aggregate a sum in excess of that necessary to confer 
jurisdiction on this Court. 
For the foregoing reasons your petitioners pray that a 'vrit 
of error and supersedeas may be awarded them, and tho 
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award of the Industrial CommissiQn of Virginia, herein conl-
p!ained of, be reviewed and reversed, and that judg·ment be 
entered by this Honorable Court in accordance with the prin-
ciples herein contended for. 
And your petitioners will ever pray, etc. 
Your petitioners aver that attached hereto is a certified 
copy of statement of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and others matters pertinent to the claim, as shown by the rec-
ords of the Industrial Commission, and ask that it be filed 
with, and as a part of, this petition for a writ of error. 
Your petitioners aver that a copy of this petition for a 
writ of error has been mailed to counsel for the claimant by 
registered mail addressed to Honorable J. W. Eggleston, Citi-
zens Bank Building, Norfolk, Virginia, on the 1st day of Sep-
tember, 1933, before this petition was presented to the Court 
or a tTudge thereof, or filed with the Clerk of the Court. 
Counsel for the petitioners desire to state to the Court 
orally their reasons for requesting a review and reversal of 
the award of the Industrial Commission by this Court. 
CONTINENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,. 
By PARRISH & BUTCHER, 
W. J. PARRISH, JR., 
R. R-. PARRISH, 
Of Counsel. 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
I, W. J. Parrish, Jr., an attorney-at-law, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of .Virginia, do certify. that in my 
opinion it is proper that the award complained of in the fore-
going petition for a writ of error should be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
W. J. PARRISH, JR. 
Received Sept. 1, 1933. 
M.B. W 
Sept. 1933.. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond $2,500.00. 
Rec'd Sept. 29, 1933. 
M. B. WATTS, Cl~rk. 
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RECORD 
James. S. Gough, Claimant, · 
vs. 
Continental Lif.e Insurance Company, Employer, 
Aetna Life Insurance Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 238-385. 
Claimant appeared in person. 
Harry Nicholson, Attorney-at-Law, 626 Dickson Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia, for Claimant. 
E. G. Farley, Adjuster, Aetna Life Insurance Company, 
924 Royster Building, Norfolk, Virginia; E. M. Parrish, Ad-
juster, Aetna Life Insurance Company, State-Planters Bank 
Building, Richmond, Virginia, and T. A.. Long, Manager, 
Continental Life Insurance Company, 621 Board of Trade 
Building, Norfolk, Virginia, for defendant. 
Hearing before Chairman Nickels, at Norfolk, Virginia, 
April 17, 1933. 
page 2 } Chairman Nickels: 
Note: It is agreed that the average weekly wage was $51.00. 
·This case is .submitted upon an agreement of facts, as fol-
lows, viz.: 
__ (After some discussion among the counsel for the respec-
tive parties, and the Commissioner presiding, it was decided 
to allow the claimant and others to testify, and the case be 
. decided upon the record thus submitted.-8tenog. Note.) 
All witnesses having been duly sworn, the following tes-
timony is taken, viz. : 
JAMES S. GOUGH, Claimant. 
Mr. Nicholson : 
Q.. What is your name 7 
A.. James S. Gough. 
Q. What is your occupation Y 
A. Insurance Agent with the Continental Life Insurance 
Company. 
page 3 } Q. Where were you working on J anl_Jary 16, 1933 Y 
A. I was working through what is commonly 
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known as Great Bridge Road in the vicinity of the Richmond 
Cedar Works. 
Q. Were you working for the Continental Life Insur.ance 
Company? · .. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As collector and agent f 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. You received some injuries on that datef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. State briefly how you received them and whe:.:e you were 
and the circumstances. · 
A~ I started at Portlock, Virginia, and made collections 
from the Richmond Cedar Works through Great Bridge down 
Jamestown (f) Road and back through what known as the 
Elbow R<>ad to Butt's Station. And after-' I think 
page 4 ~ the last c-ollection I made on my entry was at Mr. 
Doxey's house, from a couple of boys whom I had 
known for about a year. One was named Earl Proctor and 
one Clifton Doxey. After continuing ori my collection-· these 
boys were dressed and asked if I would take them to a place 
called Oak Grove. The Proctor boy -got in the 1·ear -and the 
·Doxey boy got in the seat with me. They told me before they 
bad left the house that they had intended to meet some boys 
at Oak Grove, but, when we reached OakGrove,.ther~·were no 
boys there-.-
Q. Just a moment-Was this on your -route or did it take 
you off your route Y • 
· A. No, sir, strictly on my road. I was going ,from Oak 
Grove to Great Bridge down to ~fr. Gray's. 
Q. For- what -purpose? 
·. A. I was there about 2 :00 o'clock in the day and ~fr. Gray 
wasn't at honle,-
Q. What were you going tl1ere forf 
A. To malre a collection and get some insurance 
page 5 ~ straightened out. . . . 
Q. And this was on the route and the road to ~{ r. 
Gray's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it didn't take you off your road 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, proceed from there. 
A. I told them that I had to go through· Great Bridge, 
a11d J)l~y said that, _if these boys didn't meet them, I should 
take them as far as Great Bridge. 
Q. They didn't meet them at Oak Grove? 
A. No, sir. 
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.Q. And. you proceeded on to Great Bridge? 
A. Yes, sir. There were a number of people at Great 
Bridge, and they told me, if I met them, to bring them back. 
So, I pieked them up and told them that I was in a hurry as 
I had some other colle-ctions to make and to see 
page 6 ~ some prospects for new business that night. So, the 
Eagle Service Station was the nearest point to their 
destination on the way home, and I told them I would put 
them off there. After proc-eeding on the road, one of tho 
boys-I think his father worked for Mr. Williamson-and I 
asked the Doxey boy, "That is the man your father works 
for?" and at that time I got a. tap on the head. It would 
have taken a half hour to make a couple of collections and 
that would have finished up my day's work. It was on J\1:o~­
.day and my days a.re usually heavier on Monday and Tues-
day. 
Q. Was this Eagle Service Station on the road back to-T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mrs. Yates was one of the people you were going to see 
---,on the way back t 
A. Yes, sir, for a colle-ction. 
Q. It was something concerning your insurance .business? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
J>age 7 } Q. W ~s it the boy in front or the one sitting in 
the back who struck you 1 
A. The one in the back. 
Q. What sort of car were you driving' 
A. Ford, 1\'Iodel "A". 
Q. The Doxey boy was sitting next to you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the other boy in the back was who~ 
A. Earl Proctor. 
1\Ir. Parrish: 
Q. Yon had collected some money fro1n the father of one of 
these boys? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were on your way to another client's house 
to -collect some money 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you let these boys out at Great Bridge and then 
went to get son1e money on a debit and then con- . 
pag·e 8 } tinue ori? 
A. Yes, sir. I was to put them out at Eagle 
Service Station. I still had a couple of cases to collect after 
. I left the Eagle Service Station. 
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Q. Did you have some insurance for either of these boys 
that you picked upY 
Q. Have insurance on them f 
A. Yes, sir. 
A. Yes, sir, had insurance on both of them. 
Q. They were insured by their fathers f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had no debit to collect from them f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Merely rode them down the road as an ·accommodation T 
A. Yes, sir. They were to meet these boys and I took 
them farther, as they didn't find the boys. 
page 9 ~ (Mr. Nicholson: We have a witness who testifies 
that she lives on the road and he was to call on her. 
Mr. Parrish: We admit" that. 
Chrm. Nickels: 
Note. Continued disability is admitted.) 
Witness excused. 
BENJ. A~ DOGGETT, M. D. 
Mr. Nicholson: 
Q. You are attending Mr. Gough¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For how long have you been attending him 1 
A. Since Jan nary 16, 1933. · 
.,, 
.-
Q. What was his condition since that timef 
page 10 ~ A. I saw him January 16th, at night, at St. Vin-
cent Hospital, at 'vhich time he was suffering from 
the effects of being hit on the head; had a long laceration of 
each ear, a fracture--comminuted, depressed-on each side 
of. his skull. He was operated on by Dr. C. ·C. Coleman, on 
January 27, 1933. He remained in the hospital until Mareb 
31, 1933. I saw him at home and have seen him at my office 
since that time; the last time a.t my of.fice was April 15th. 
Q. Are you still attending him T 
A. He comes in occasionally, more for observation, you 
might say, than attendance; there is nothing particularly to 
do for him at this time. 
~ Did you make a.n X-ray of this man? 
A. Yes, sir, he had an X-ray about the 2d or 3d day he 
was in the hospital, and, as I saw it, it showed that he had a 
comminuted, depressed fracture on each side of his skull. 
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The right side was v:ery much depressed and re-
page 11 r quired an operation, which I have mentioned be-
fore. · 
Q. What is his condition as of todayY 
A. Well, his condition at this time, he is continuously com:.. 
plaining of some headache, is unsteady in his gait and is 
having a lot of dizziness. His wife tells me that he is emo-
tional, and his reasoning doesn't just seem to be quite right 
yet; she can't depend upon him to do what he starts out to do. 
Q. There has .been an X-ray made since the one you re-
ferred toY 
A. Yes, sir, one about 10 days or 2 weeks ago. 
Q. What did you find there f 
A. It showed that the depression had been relieved. Of 
course, there were some areas--defects in the skull on the 
right side. I cannot state positively that they will fill in 
completely, if they are covered oy:er by the temporal muscle; 
how·ever, I do not think that the defects, in them-
page 12 r selves, should give him any trouble. In other words, 
being covered over by the muscle, you cannot feel 
it. 
Q. What is his mental condition 7 
A. As I said, his mental condition, he has these periods of 
confusion at times, and his wife tells me that his judgment is 
not what you might say sound; that she cannot depend upon 
him to do little things that he wants to do, he won't get them 
right. 
Q. What did your observation disclose? 
A. At the times he was in the office to see me, there didn't 
~eem to be any particular mental trouble other tha.n he ex-
hibited some tendencies toward depression. But, so far as an-
swering questions, there seemed to be no trouble. 
Q. Has he apparently regained his strength 1 
A. Well, so far as muscle is concerned, he has, but he has 
not regained his equilibrium; in other words, he 
page 13 r is unsteady, cannot walk about. 
Q. He is not fit to go back to work! 
A. No, sir, because at times he stumbles about. That is 
not a question of strength but of equilibrium. 
(Mr. Parrish: We admit that he is disabled. 
Mr. Nicholson: Lette·r dated April 13, 1933, of Dr. D. J. 
Alexander, Norfolk, Virginia, is introduced as "Exhibit A" 
with the record.) 
Mr. Parrish: 
Q. Doctor, what was Mr. Gough's condition on March 17, 
1933, approximately as of that date? 
--------- --- ------- --
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Q. March 17th Y 
A. Yes, sir, about four weeks ago? 
A. Just about what it- is now, 1 would say. 
page 14 r Q. Does he come down to your of.fice unattended¥ 
A. No, sir; Mrs. Gough has been with him each 
time he has been there, ang she says she doesn't allow hhn 
to go out alone. 
Q. Does he come downtown 1 
A. He comes downtown to n1y office. Whether he comes 
downtown to go shopping, I do not know. I hav~ tried to get 
·him out in the open. _ 
Q. Is there anything in the way of actual treatment neees-
sary at this time . _ 
A: Nothing that I know of, except that he has had infected 
teeth, and Dr. Alexander has attended them; and he has de:. 
fective vision, and he has been fitted with glasses. Other 
_than attending him for things of that sort, I do not know. 
Q. Do you know whether there is anything in connection 
between his teeth and the accident he had? 
A. I can't see how they could be. The man was 
page 15 ~ hit on the head with a hatchet, ·and I don't see how 
diseased teeth could affect him at- all. 
Witness excused. 
Hearing concluded. 
_page -16 ~ EXHIBIT ''A''. 
~Dr. D. J. Alexander 
401-2-3 Medical Arts Building 
Norfolk, Virginia, April 13, 1933 
The Industrial Commission 
Norfolk, V a., 
Gentlemen :-
In regards tbe case of ~fr. ,J. S. Gough. This gentleman had 
several teeth knocked loose during; his accident which have 
been ·extracted from time to time owing to the condition of 
his head. The necessary dental work cannot be done for sev-
eral months. . 
- His physicians have advised against the to-rapid extraction 
and necessary replacements. · 
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Therefore in my opinion an extension of 180 days will be 
nece~sary. 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) n: J. ALEXANDER DMD 
D. J. ALEXANDER D. 1\L D. 
e.s.a. ;d~j.a. 
page 17 ~ James S. Gough, Cl·aimant, 
vs. • 
Continental Life Insurance Company, Employer 
Aetna Life. Insurance Company, Insurer. 
· Claim No. 238-385 
Claimant appeared in person. 
Harry Nicholson for Claimant. 
:Afay 6, 1933. 
E. G. Farley, E. 1\I. Parrish and T. A. Long for Defendant. 
Hearing· before Chairman NickelsJ at Norfolk, Virginia, 
April 17, 19~3. 
Nickels, Chairman, rendered the opinion. 
IfiNDINGS OF FACT. 
The Claimant, who was agent for the Employer, earning a 
weekly wag·e of $51.00, sustained an accident by 
page 18} being struck a blow with a hatchet on the head 
by a boy whose father was -carrying insurance in 
the company which the claimant was then representing. The 
assailant was being given, as an accommodation, -a ride in the 
rear seat of the car then being operated· by the Claimant 
'vhile in the course of his employment. There was shown 
. no notiee for the assailant's striking the claimant the blow 
-on the head witl1 the hatchet. .As result of the blow, he su::=;-
. tained a fracture of the skull. 
The. record discloses that claimant was totally disabled 
from the date of the accident, on January 16, 1933, to the 
date of the hearing. The prognosis is that· of continued dis-
ubility for some time, dependent upon the progress in mak-
-ing a recovery. · 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The only question involved is whether or not the accident 
arose out of the employment; it is conceded that same arose 
in the course of it. The claimant was clearly discharging 
duties, at the time of the accident, within the purview of the 
. contract of hire. The hazard or risk incurred un-
page 19 ~ der the circumstances prevailing in this case were 
those emanating from positive action on the part 
of the claimant in granting a fav:or to the assailant. The 
fact that no htotive appears renders it impossible to formu-
late any conclusion rela.ting to the cause for the assault. Any 
effort to fathom the depths of this essential enquiry leads us 
into the field of surmise and conjecture. The reoord is silent 
in furnishing a scintilla of evidence, be it factual or circum-
stantial, in reference to the res gestae. In view of the many 
cases decided by the Commission and our Court of the last 
resort, it is p~rhaps unnecessary to make reference to ad-
judicated cases holding that the burden of proof rests upon 
the claimant to prove an accident ''arising out of and in the 
course of the employment.'' 
See 14 N. C. C. A., p. 233, Note 11 :B, as follows: 
"Collector Shot by Unknown Person.-In Compensation 
proceedings it appeared that petitioner's husband was a route 
foreman in the employ of a brewing· company, his duties be-
ing to look after the various beer delivery routes 
page 20 ~ and to see that they were properly conducted, and 
on S'aturdays he had a beer delivery where he de-
livered beer and collected the moneys therefor. On a Satur-
day night deceased made a delivery of 1beer at· a dwelling 
house in Atlantic City leaving his wagon in the street, a lit-
tle distance away. and. while returning to his wagon, he was 
assaulted and shot by some person unknow. He mounted 
his wagon and returned to the brewery and accounted to 
his employer for· the moneys collected by him and then went 
to a hospital where, 10 days later, he died from the effect~ 
of the gunshot wound. The ·Court below found that the death 
was the result of an accident arising out of decedent's em-· 
ployment and rendered judgment for plaintiff. On. appeal. 
the Supreme Court said that the trial judge obviously acted 
npon the theory that as deceased was a collector for a brew-
ery and his duties required him to go into a neighborhood 
where lawless acts were frequently committed and lawles~ 
characters congregated, he was exposed to a r~k of being at-
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tacked by lawless persons, for the purpose of robbery which 
was a risk directly, or, at least, indirectly con-
page 21} nected with his employm.ent. The Court, however, 
did not think that the character 0~ the place where 
the attack was made was of any special significance, since 
it did not appear that the employer had any notice or knowl-
edge of the danger .of the locality, and that being the case 
the employer ought not to be chargeable with any risk which 
the place where the work was to be performed entailed by 
reason of some peculiar and extraordinary situation existing 
there, unless it was made to appear further that he was aware 
of such added risk. ·Continuing, the Court said that if it 
had ·appeared that the attack had for its object robbery, then 
it would have been immaterial whether such attack was made 
in a lawless or a law-abiding district, and the case would 
then fall within the principle laid d9wn iri Nisbet vs. RO!!Jn_e 
& Bur.n .(1910), 2 K. B. 689, 3 N. C. C. A. 268, cited with ap-
proval in Bryant vs. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 3 N. :0. C. A. 
585, 86 Atl. 458 (1913), where it was held that the death of 
the cashier who was robbed and murdered in a railway car-
riage while carrying money to pay the wages of his enl-
ployers' workmen was caused by accident arising· 
page 22 } "out of" and in the course of his employment, on 
the ground that the risk of being robbed and mur-
dered is a risk incidental to the employment of those who 
are known to carry considerable sums in cash on regular days 
by the same route to the same place. In the present case, 
said the .Court, the testimony utterly failed to show any mo-
tive for the attack. Deceased's assailant was unknown. His 
motive in making the attack was also unknown. No robbery 
or attempt at robbery was s;hown. The person who shot de-
ceased might have shot him out of revenge for some fancied 
wrong, or by mistake or accident. There was no proven fact 
or circumstance that connected the shooting either directly 
or indirectly with the employment of deceased, either as 
driver or collector. The. judgment was, therefore, reversed. 
Schmoll vs. Weisbred <I; Hess Brewing Co., 89 N. J. L. 150, 
97 Atl. 723 (1916)." 
(Worlrmen's Compensation Law by .Schneider, Vol. 1, page 
999.} 
page 23 } In view of the foregoing, it is found necessary 
to dismiss the present claim from the docket. 
Each party will pay its own costs in this proceeding. 
2S Supren1e Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
page 24 } INDUSTRIAL CO~IMISS~ON OF VIRGINIA. 
Claim No. 238-385. 
Case· of James S. Gough. 
NOTICE OF A. \V ARD. 
Date J\!Iay 6, 1933. 
To Continental Life Insurance Company (Employer) 
Board of Trade Building, 
. Norfolk, Virginia. 
and James S. Gough (Claimant) 
216 W. 37th Street, 
Norfolk, Virginia: . 
and Aetna Life Insurance Con1pany (Insurance Carrier) 
Richmond, Virginia. 
.• 
you are hereby notified that a. hearing· was held· in the 
above-styled case before Chairman Nickels at Norfolk, Vir-
gi:n.i,a, on April 17, 1933, and a decision rendered on M'ay 6, 
1933, denying this claimant compensation on the ground that 
the evidence indicated his accident did not arise 
page 25 } out. of and in the course of his employment. 
. This claim is, therefore, dismissed and each 
party will pay his own costs in this proceeding. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
Attest: 
W. H. NICKELS, J~., Chairman. 
· . W. F. BURSEY, Secretary. 
page 26 ~ Virginia : 
Industrial Com1nission of Virginia. 
·Continental Life Insurance Company, Employer 
James · Gough, ·Claimant 
Aetna Life Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier. 
APPLICATION O:B, CLAIMANT FOR RE-HEARING OR 
REVIEW. 
James Gough, Claimant by his counsel respectfully makes 
application for 1st, re-hearing or 2nd, review in the above-
styled matter fro1n the decision of Commissioner W. H. 
Nickels, Jr., dated ~lay .6, 1933. Your applicant desires that 
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a rehearing be· granted in the above tnatter on the grounds 
of after-discovered evidence. Affidavit of the newly discov-
ered evidence is attached hereto. 
In the opinion rendered by Commissioner W. H. Nickels, 
Jr., it is conceded that the accident arose in the course of em-
ployment and the Commissioner, in said opinion, states that 
· the absence of a. motive rendered it impossible to 
page 27 ~ formulate any conclusion relating to the cause for 
the assault. 
Your claimant and his counsel were, at the time of the 
hearing, unable to furnish a motive for the assault, other 
. than the natural conclusion that it was for the purpose of 
robbery. It would have been a futile matter to have sub-
poenaed the assailants, in view of the fact that they were 
under indictment in the ·Circuit Court of Norfolk County, 
Virg·inia, on the charge of maiming and attempted robbery of 
the claimant. This matter, as will appear from the affidavit 
attached hereto and made ·a part of this application was tried 
on the 27th day of April, 1933, ten days after the hearing be-
fore the Commission. As will appear from the affidavit at-
tached hereto, Earl Proctor, one of the assailants who took 
the stand and testified in his own behalf, stated that the as-
sault on the Clain1ant was made for the purpose to take from 
the Claimant his automobile. This clearly indicates that the 
motive for the assault was robbery. The Comn1ission is well 
aware· of the fact that the assailants c.ould not have been made 
to testify at the hearing because, under la"r' they could not 
be forced to give testimony against themselves. 
page 28 ~ This newly discovered evidence was discovered 
1st, after the hearing of A.pril 17, 1933, 2nd, the 
new evidence is such that due diligence would not have se-
cured it before the criminal trial, which was April 27, 1933, 
3rd, the evidence is new and material and not merely cumula-
tive and 4th, the new evidence ought to produce an opposite 
result at the re-hearing or review. . 
The clain1ant prefers a re-hearing in his matter for the 
purpose of allowing· him to introduce the new testimony, 
hut if the Commission is of the opinion that Claimant is not 
. entit,led to a re-hearing, but a review, he requests that he be 




By HARRY NICHOLSON, 
His Counsel. 
3o Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia .. 
page 29 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
. This day personally appeared before the undersigned No-
tary Public in· the :City of Norfolk, State of Virginia, A. 0. 
I..ynch, who first being duly sworn, deposed and said: 
I am Commonwealth's Attorney for Norfolk County, Vir-
ginia, and as such prosecuted the cases of the ·Commonwealth 
of Virginia vs. Earl Proctor a~d Clifton Doxey, charged with 
maiming and attempted robbery of one James S. Gough, 
which cases wer~ tried in the ·Circuit Court of Norfolk ·County, 
Virginia, on the 27th day of April, 1933. Upon the arraign-
ment of the said defendants, the said Earl Proctor enter~d 
a plea of guilty and Clifton Doxey entered a plea of not guilty 
of said charges, and upon the request of the said defendants 
and the consent of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the 
judge of said Court tried the said cases. 
After the evidence for the 'Commonwealth, showing the in-
jury to Mr. Gough and certain other facts tending 
page 30 ~ to establish the guilt of the accused, the said Earl 
Proctor took the stand and testified in his own be-
half, stating· that he was in the hon1e of Clifton Doxey late 
in the afternoon of the day of the alleged offence and saw 
Mr. Goug·h in the Doxey home, that Clifton Doxey secured a 
small hatchet and gave it to Proctor, who hid the same in 
his clothing, that later they asked J\.fr. Gough to give them a 
ride in his automobile from the Doxey home out to Great 
Bridge, that when Mr_. Gough reached Great Bridge they left 
his car as Mr. Gough had to go a short distance south of 
·Great Bridge to make a collection for the insurance com-
}Jany which he represented, that they told Mr. Gough when 
he came back they would like to ride with him from Great 
Bridg~e over to Butt's station road, that when Mr. Gough came 
by as aforesaid, he stopped and picked Proctor and Doxey 
up and started on towards the Butt's station road, that Doxev 
was sitting on the front seat of the car '\vith Mr. Gough and 
that Proctor was sitting on the back seat of said car alone, 
that as they were passing the residence of Mr. C. ~f. Wil .. 
. liamson on the way to Bt;Itt's station road, that 
page 31 ~ he, Earl Proctor, struck Mr. Gough on the head 
with the hatchet and then passed the hatchet over 
to Clifton Doxey, that the other blows on the head received 
by Mr. Gough must have been inflicted by Doxey, that their 
purpose in making the assault on l\1r. Gough was to take from 
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for a ride, that Mr. Gough continued driving the car until he 
came near a service station on Butt's road and as the car 
left the road it struck some sign boards, making a noise which 
attracted the attention of the occupants of the service sta-
tion, that when said occupants of the service station ran. out 
Proctor and Doxey jumped 'from the car and fled through the 
woods towards their home .. 
Clifton Doxey also testified in his own behalf and denied 
that he had anything whatever to do with the assault and 
attampted robbery of Mr. Gough. 
Judge C. W. ·Coleman, Judge of said Court, announced at 
the conclusion of the evidence in the case that he was con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt from said evf-
page 32 } dence, that the said defendants, Earl Proctor and 
Clifton Doxey, were guilty of the charges in said 
indictment and further announced that he would communi-
cate with Mr. Arthur W. James of the Department of Public 
Welfare of the .State ·of Virginia, and discuss with him 
whether the said boys should be committed to the Board of 
Welfare or sentenced to the penitentiary. 
(Signed) A. 0. LYNCH. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned No-
. tary Public in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, this the 11th day 
of May, 1933. · 
(Signed) ALICE H. SHAFFER, 
N ota~y Public. 
page 33 r BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF VIRGINIA. -
CLAIM NO. 238-385. 
JAMES S. GOUGH 
versus 
CONTINENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
Before me, Julian T. Gravely, a Notary Public, in and 
for the City aforesaid in the Commonwealth of Virginia, has 
32 Supr~me Court of .Appeals of Virginia:· 
this day personally appeared E. M. P·arrish, who, being duly 
sworn deposes and says that he ia adjuster and agent of 
Aetna Life Insurance Company, which company carried work-
men's compensation insurance for the employer in the above 
· case; that on or about February 1, 1933, E. G. Far-
page 34 ~ ley, Adjuster of said Aetna Life Insurance Com-
pany, called to intervie'v Earl Proctor and Clifton 
D·oxey at the jail of the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, 
and discussed with them the circumstances attending the 
assault upon the said James S. Gough on the 16th day of 
January, 1933; that during such intervw'v the ·said E. G~ Far-
ley obtained from the said Earl Proctor and Clifton Doxey a 
written statement dated February 1, 1933, in which it was 
set forth that the motive of the said assault was to take from 
the said Gough his automobile; that on the occasion of the 
said interview with the assail3;nts, the said assailants at no 
. time refused to discuss the assault o:r: to devulge their motive 
for the assault, but on the contrary freely and frankly re-
vealed the reasons therefor; that the said statements were 
obtained in the ordinary course of investigation, and it is 
the affiant's belief that the claimant or his counsel could have 
obtained similar statements on or before the hearing held 
by the Industrial Commission of Virginia in this claim on 
.April 17, 1933. The said E. M. Parrish further 
page 35 r deposes and says that he 'vas present at the hear-
ing held by the Industrial Commission of Virginia 
on April 17, 1933, in the. City of Norfolk, Virginia, and the 
claimant or his counsel did not state to the Industrial Com-
mission that they desired to prove the motive for the assault 
by the said assailants, nor did they request a continuance of 
the hearing until such time as they would be in a position .to 
compel the said assailants to testify in this claim. It does not 
appear in the record of the Industrial Commission that the 
said assailants were summoned as witnesses on behalf of the 
claimant, or that they claimed their privilege of not giving 
testimony against themselves in this hearing. 
(Signed) E. M. PARRISH. 
Subscribed and sworn to. before me this 15th day of June, 
1933. 
(Signed) .JULIAN T. GRAVELY, 
Notary PubliG. 
My commission expires Sept. 11, 1933. 
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page 36 } James S. Gough, Claimant, 
vs. 
Continental Lif-e Insurance Co., Employer Aetna Life Insur-
ance Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 238-385. 
August 4, 1933. 
Mr. J. W. Eggleston, Attorney-at-Law, Citizens Bank Build-
ing, Norfolk, Virginia, for the Claimant; Parrish and Butcher 
(~Ir. R. R. Parrish), Attorney-at-Law, l\!utual Building, Rich-
mond, Virginia, for the defendant. 
REVIEW BEFORE THE FULL COMMISSION AT RICH-
M:OND, ·viRGINIA, ON JUNE 15TH, 1933. 
Deans, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
pag-e 37 } A review in the above styled case was requested 
by the claimant who was aggrieved at the de-
cision of Nickels, Chairman, of May 6th, 1933, and the award 
of the same date dismissing the claim on the ground that 
the evidence indicated that the injury did not arise out of 
the employment. As to tll{~ decision of Nickels, Chairman, 
it is not compatible with that of the majority of the Com-
mission. The decision of 1\iay 6th and the award entered 
thereon is hereby set aside and the majority of the Com-
mission makes its own findings of fact. 
T. A. Long, District ~Ianager for the employer, completed 
the Employer's ~,irst Report of Accident on January 28th, 
1933, indicated that James S. Gough, salesman and ·employee 
of the company for one and a half years, at an average 'veekly 
wage of $51.00, ''was carrying two young men down road 
in his car while on business of the company and they 
waylayed him 'vith a hatchet". 
The claimant testified that he was an agent and collector 
of the Continental Life Insurance Company and 
page 38 } that on January 16th, 1933, he 'vas working through 
a community kno,vn as Great Bridge R<lad in the 
vicinity of the Richmond Cedar Works. He started at Port-
lock, Virginia, aucl made collectioi1s from the Richmond Cedar 
'Vorks through the Great Bridge Road down to James town 
road and back through what was known as Elbow Road to 
Butt's. Station. The last collection was made at Doxev's 
home. where he collocted premiums on the policies of t~o 
34 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
boys whom he had known for about a year. One boy was 
named Earl Proctor and one Clifton Doxey. It developed, 
however, that the premiums were paid by Doxey's father for 
the policy on this young man's life. After making these 
collections Proctor and Doxey were dress-ed and asked if he 
would let them ride to a place ·called Oak Grove. The Proc-
tor boy took the· seat in the rear of the car and Doxey in 
the seat along _side of the claimant. These boys had ex-
plained to the claimant before they left the house that they 
intended to meet some boys at Oak ·Grove. but when this 
place was reached there were no boys there. Those boys got 
out of the car-at this place which was in the after-
page 39 ~ noon and claimant continued on his route from 
Oak Grove to Gre.at Bridge to a policyholder by 
the name of Gray. Gray was not there and he could not 
make the collection and have some insurance matters ad-
justed for which purpose he made the visit, and then re-
turned by way of Oak Grove to go through the Great Bridge 
section. These boys then asked him if they could go with 
him as far as the bridge as they did not meet the other 
men as contemplated at Oak Grove. Claimant told these boy:; 
that he was in a hurry as he had some other collections an~ 
prospects for new business that night, however, he consented 
to take them on this part of his route. The Eagle service 
station was the nearest point to their destination on the 'va.y 
home and he told them that he would .have to put them off 
at this place, but as they reached the property owned by a 
Mr. Williamson, the claimant asked the Doxey boy if that 
was where his father worked. At this point he received a tap 
on his head.. At no point during this entire journey had the 
claimant deviated from his route or suspended his business 
activities but did pick these boys up at their re-
page 40 ~ quest and gave them a ride. The boys were known 
to him and were the sons of his policyholders. 
This incident occurred on a ](Ionday on which day claimant's 
duties were heavier than the rest of the week and within 
about half an hour prior to the time that he would have com-
pleted the day's activities. At the time of the assault he 
was en route to the home of a Miss Yates in connection with 
insurance affairs. It was admitted by the representative of 
the insurance carrier that the witness could be produced who 
would testify that she lived on the road in question and that 
she had expected a call from the claimant that afternoon for 
insurance purposes. 
The above constitutes the facts in connection with the acci-
dent. Nickels, Chairman, has taken the position in his opinion · 
I 
I• 
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there was no motive for the assailant striking the claimant 
the blow on the head with the hatchet and that they were 
being given, as an accommodation, a ride in the car operated 
by the claimant while in the course of the employment. And 
further that the hazard or risk incurred under the 
page _41 ~ circumstances in this case were those emanating 
from positive action on the part of the claimant 
in granting a favor to the assailants, and that any effort to 
fathom the depths of this essential enquiry leads into the 
field of surmise and conjecture. The patent facts are that 
the claimant ·was operating an automobile in order to cover 
his terrotory. He was an insurance agent and collector and 
naturally carried money on his person. The assailants were 
sons of a man who paid claimant premiums for insurance 
policies carried by claimant's company. There was no ani-
mosity between the claimant and the assailants upon which 
conjecture could be placed that the assault was for· the pur-
pose of revenge and the natural conclusion follows that it 
was a. genuine hold-up or assault for the purpose of .taking 
either the automobile or the money on the claimant's person. 
Any other conclusion would be surmise or conjecture and 
would place a most strict interpretation upon the provisions 
of the requirements of the Workmen's Com pen-
page 42 ~ .sation Act when the Courts have admonished the 
Commission that the Compensation Act is highly 
remedial and should be liberally construed to effect its benefi-
cent purpose. See Gobble vs. Clinch Valley Go., 141 Va. 303; 
and Farmers JYlfg. Go. vs. 1if1arfel, 144 Va. 98. 
Our Supreme Court of Appeals has said in the case of 
lnde1nnity Ins. Go. vs~ Nalls, 168 S. E. 346, that in the con~ 
struction of the statute the chief concern of the Court is to 
ascertain the intention of the Legislature. The spirit of the 
law is as strong a link in a legislative enactment as the lan-
guage employed and it is clear that the legislative intent 
should not be whittled away by the keen edge of grammatical 
construction. It is just as pertinent that the true intent of 
the Compensation Act should not be destroyed by technicali-
ties or by a too strict construction of the provisions of the 
Act since it is the intention that the Act shall be liberally 
construed. 
The question of burden of proof has been battered about to 
a great extent and now appears to be placed on the 
page 43 } claimant to prove that he sustained accidental in-
juries arising out of and in the course of the 
employment. The employer's insurance carrier has taken 
the position in this case that the accident did not arise out 
• 
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of the employment but it will be shown later that it had within 
its possession definite knowledge of the facts which conclu-
sively established the motive and which made this claim 
one arising out of the employment even by the ·strictest in-
terpretation. The claimant's evidence was the only evidence 
introduced at the hearing in- connection with the assault. 
It was not contradicted and the finding is, therefore, made 
that he sustained accidental injuries \Vhich not only arose 
in the course of the employment but arose out of the em-
. ployment. 
Counsel for clain1ant filed petition asking for the privi-
lege of taking further testimony on the ground of additional 
or after-discovered evidence. While the petition in substance 
meets the requirements of the Commission's rule as to addi-
tional or after discovered evidence, the facts set 
page 44 ~ fo1·th in the petition do not justify a re-opening 
· of this claim for that purpose. Counsel for claim-
ant aver that additional facts could not have been obtained 
by due diligence inasmuch as the two men who committed 
the assault were under indictment in the Circuit C'ourt of 
N o1·folk County on the charge of maiming and attempted 
robbery of the claimant and it would have been futile to 
have subpoenaed the assailants inasmuch as the laws do not 
require one to testify against their own interest. An affi-
davit of A. 0. Lynch, Commonwealth's Attorney for Norfolk 
County, Virginia, was attached to the petition for a re-open-
ing of the claim and this affidavit indicates that Earl Proctor 
and Clifton Doxey were charged with maiming and attempted 
robbery of Mr. Ja1nes S. Gough, which cases were tried in 
the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, on April 27th, 
1933. Upon the arraigmnent of the said defendants, the 
said Earl Proctor entered a plea of guilty and Clifton Doxey 
entered a plea of not guilty of said charges and upon the 
request of the said defendants and the consent of the Attor-
ney for the Commonwealth, the Judge of said 
page 45 ~ Court tried the said cases. Earl Proctor took the 
stand and testified in his own behalf, stating that 
he was in the home of Clifton Doxey late in the afternoon 
of the day of the alleged offense and saw Gough in the Doxey 
home, and that Clifton Doxey secured a small hatchet and 
·gave it to him (Proctor), who hid the same in his clothing, 
and later they asked Gough to give them a ride in his auto-
mobile from the Doxey hom~ to Gr€at Bridge, and that when 
Goug·h reached this place they left his car as he (Gough) 
had to go a short distance South of Great Bridge to make 
collections in connection with his business. "When he re-
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t~uned to this point, they asked him for permission to ride 
further and permission was granted and while en route Doxey 
'vas seated on the back seat alone and that Proctor struck 
Gough on the head with the hatchet and then passed the 
hatchet over to Doxey 'vho inflicted other blows. The pur-
pose of making an assault on Gough was to take from him 
his automobile in order that they might take some girls 
for a ride. Immediately after the assault the car left the 
road, struck some sign boards which attracted nearby per-
. sons and as they came to the rescue Proctor and 
page 46 ~ Dox~y jumped from the car and fled through the 
'voods towards their home. Doxey testified in his 
own behalf and denied that he had anything whatever to 
do with the assault and attempted robbery of Gough. 
It is singular that interposing the re-opening of the claim 
on the ground of additional or after-discovered evidence that 
a r·epresentative of the Aetna Life Insurance Company, should 
submit an affidavit indicating that this information was avail.: 
able and that he himself had such information within his 
possession prior to the hearing but did not disclose same 
at the hearing. 'The affidavit indicates representatives of 
the company called on Earl Proctor and Clifton Doxey at 
the jail of the Circuit Court of Norfolk County on or about 
February 1st, 1933, and discussed with thew the circum-
stances attending the assault on January 16th, 1933; that dur-
ing said intervie,v, one of the representatives obtained from 
Proctor and Doxey a written statement dated February 1st, 
1933, in which it was set forth that the motive of the assault 
was to take from the said Gough his automobile, 
page 4 7 ~ and that on this occasion the assailants, although 
under arraignment, at no time refused to discuss 
the assault or to divulge their motive for the assault but 
on the contrary freely and frankly revealed the reasons 
therefor, and these statements W·ere obtained in the ordinary 
course of investigation, and it is the said representative's 
belief that counsel for claimant could have obtained similar 
statements on or before the hearing held before the Indus-
trial Commission on April 17th, 1933, or ten days before 
the trial of criminal charges in the Norfolk Circuit Court. 
The staten1ent of the representative has one definite pur-
pose and it will be accepted to show that by the use of due 
diligence counsel for clain1ant could have obtained this in-
formation prior to the hearing. Inasmuch as counsel for 
claimant did not show the use of due diligence in ascertain-
ing tlie information, and further inasmuch as the affidavit 
. of the representative indicates that these assailant~ frankly 
38 Supreme Court of ApP,eals of Virginia. 
and freely gave the inforinatioD:, the Commission is justified 
in refusing the re-opening of the claim on the ground of addi:-
tional or after-discovered evidence and according to the 
claimant's petition. 
page 48 ~ The affidavit of the representative has another 
very s&lient feature in connection with same. The 
statements obtained from Proctor and Doxey gave a very 
definite motive for the assault. This information was lmown 
as early as February 1st or practically two weeks after 
the accident and yet the employer's insurance carrier allowed 
this claim to go to a hearing before the Commission on the 
g-round that the accident did not arise out of the employment: 
This is the first case that -the Commission has had before 
it where a full disclosure of facts has not been made· by 
the carrier or representative, although such facts would 
clearly 'varrant the payment of compensatiou and medical 
benefits. The evidence of Parrish corroborates in its entirety 
the information contained in the petition of the claimant 
and should be taken as admission of all facts which could 
be produced at a further hearing to establish a motive for 
the assault. However, as the evidence at the hearing con-
clusively shows, and the finding is so made, that the injury 
arose out of the employment as well as in the 
page 49 ~ course of the employme:pt, and if counsel for claim-
ant did not use due diligence in ascertaining this 
information the Commission must of necessity refnse claim-
ant's petition in this respect. The majority of the Commis-
sion takes this opportunity to warn all those who are charged 
'vith the adjustment of claims under the provisions of the 
Compensation Act, that should repetition of such a fact as 
is disclosed in this case be made that the cost of procedure 
'viii be assessed against the guilty party. Section 63 of 
the Compensation Act reads as follows: 
''If the Industrial Commission or any court before whom 
any proceedings are brought under this act shall determine 
that such proceedings have been brought, prosecuted or de-
fended without reasonable ground, it may assess the w.hole 
cost of the proceedings upon the party who has brought 
or defended them. Acts 1924, p. 478. '' 
And while this case is one which was defended by the car-
rier without reasonable ground, inasmuch as it 
page 50~ had ~ithin its possession facts showing the motive 
of the assault, and should know that such facts 
would ~ring the claimant 'vithin the provisions of the Com-
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pensation Act, Section 63 will not be invoked in this case 
ht~.t shall be used only as a warning in future cases. The 
Commission seeks the truth in compensation claims and shall 
expect a disclosure of all pertinent facts in consideration of 
claims and this was not done by the representative of the 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. in this instance. 
At the hearing on April 17th, Dr. B. A. Doggett testified 
that he was the attending physician and found on his first 
examination on January 16th that claimant was suffering 
from the effects of being hit on the head, had a long lacera-
tion of each ear, a comminuted, depressed fracture on each 
side of the skull, and that surgical treatment was rendered 
by Dr. C. C. Coleman on January 27th, 1933. Claimant re-
mained in the hospital for treatment until March 31st, 193::>. 
Doctor Doggett has visited claimant from that time at his 
home and at office and last treatment was given 
page 51 }- about April 15th, 1933. Claimant is continuously 
complaining of some headache, is unsteady in his 
gait and suffers from dizziness as well as being emotional. 
He is still disabled. It is anticipated that in the future that 
the carrier may raise the question that there is a pre-existing 
condition of infection of teeth or other unknown complaint 
which is cause of disability and will use this iu an effort 
to be relieved of further compensation liability. In this 
respect Doctor Doggett testified that the claimant did have 
infecte~ teeth but they were removed by Doctor Alexander 
and that there was some defective vision and he had been 
benefited with glasses. He was asked if there was anything· 
in connection between his teeth and the accident he had and 
he stated that the man was hit on the. head with a hatchet 
and that he saw no connection between diseased teeth and his 
present condition. 
This finding is made that claimant is temporarily totally 
disabled and is, therefore, -entitled to compensation at $14.00 
per week, beginning January 17th, 1933, having 
page 52 ~ been paid full wage for January 16th, 1933, the 
date he was injured. Payments will continue dur-
ing the period of disability resulting from the accident. All 
past due compensation will be paid upon receipt of this 
award and subsequent payments made every two weeks there-
after. In addition to the payment of compensation, the em-
ployer will pay the necessary medical, surgical and hospital 
attention incident to the injury. 
Claimant's wife under date of March 7th, 1933, wrote the 
Commission as follows : 
40 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia. 
''I have been advised to ask for continuance of medical 
care from 60 to 180 days for Mr. Gough. His is an unusual 
case and will require medical attention for some time yet.'' 
This·· letter was received in the Commission's office on 
March 9th, and inasmuch as the claim was then on the docket 
for hearing the question of additional medical attention be-
yond the sixty day period was deferred for consideration. 
It is the opinion of the majority of the Commis-
page 53 ~ sion that claimant's condition is of unusual and 
extraordinary nature and is such that medical at-
tention should be rendered beyond the sixty days, not to ex-
ceed one hundred and eighty days, and is to be paid by the 
·employer or insurance carrier, under the provisions of sec-
tion 26 of the Act. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
An injury may oo said to arise out of the employment 
when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon considera-
tion of all the circumstances, a causal connection between th& 
condition under which the work is required to be performed 
and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can 
be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the ·work, 
and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person fami-
liar with the whole situation as a result of the. exposure 
occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it ''arises 
out of" the employment. The causative danger must be 
peculiar to the work and must be incidental to the character 
of the business and not independent of the relation 
page 54 r of master a.nd servant. It need not have been 
foreseen or expected, but after the event it must 
appear to have had its origin in a risk ,connected with the 
employment, and to have flo,ved from the source as a rational 
consequence. See ~lcNicols case, 102 N. E. 697. See also 
Standard Oil Co. c. Clark, 184 N. E. 861, decided November 
21st, 1932. In this case a filling station operator was pro-
. ceeding to take the receipts of the day with him to his 
. home and was prohibited from leaving them in the employer's 
filling station, which he operated, overnight. On the follow-
ing day he returned the receipts of the proceeds over to the 
company representative '\\rho would come and collect them. 
On the night of the accident the package was placed in his 
lunch basket which was then placed in automobile and the 
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employee was en route home when he had a collision with 
another automobile and was instantly killed. The place where 
the accident took place was on a direct and usual route 
from the filling station to his home. The employer contended 
that the employee could take the day's proceeds to any place 
he saw fit but the weight of the evidence showed 
page 55 ~ that the employer's agent in instructing this em-
ployee had suggested that he take the money home 
vrith him for safe-keeping at the end of the day and not to 
leave it at the .station where no means for its protection 
had been provided. It was held in this case the accident 
arose out of the employment as the employee was in the 
performance of a duty enjoined upon him by his employ-
ment. His care for the funds while en route from the filling 
station to his home was as much a part of his duty as his 
work at the filling station and compensation benefits were 
allowed. 
In the instant case there 'vas no evidence introduced by 
the defendants to indicate that the employee was prohibited 
fi·om giving rides in his car to those not in the company's 
employ and the reasonable view of the entire circumstances 
is that one whose business is in contact with the general 
public is frequently asked for a ride and it is diflicult and em-
barrassing to refuse the request. In this instance the clailn-
ant was asked for a ride by two of his policyholders. It 
was known by them that he was covering the same 
page 56 ~ ground that they intended to cover and they gave 
him valid reason for wishing a ride. A refusal 
to do so by him would not have been good business practice 
and he cannot be charged with knowing the motive of the 
assault at the time, although it is definitely established that 
the motive was the taking of his automobile for personal pur-
poses. . 
The Compensation Act in the conduct of its administration 
should be attended with some knowledge and insight of human 
conduct. In this instance .the claimant conducted himself 
in a. most rational manner and one whereby anyone· else com-
ing in comtact with the publie in a sales capacity would have 
acted likewise. It has becomf' a. universal fact, however, that 
the giving of rides to strangers or hitch-hikers is a dan-
gerous practice. In this instance, however, the giving of 
this ride to the two assailants could not have been so an-
ticipated because the assailants were known to the claimant. 
But to apply the rule in the McNicols case,· it can be clearly 
seen that the assault followed as a natural concident of the 
work, and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person 
42 .Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
familiar with the whole situation as a result of 
page 57 ~ the exposure occasioned by the nature of the em-
ployment. 
The defendants will pay the cost in tlris proceeding. 
page 58 ~ Kizer, Commissioner, ~oncurring, with the follow-
ing addition. 
Candor compels me to state frankly that, upon first im-
pression, I can well see how Nickels, Chairman, reached his 
conclusion, following the hearing, in which he denied com-
pensation, but, upon mature consideration of the evidence 
taken at the hearing and the record in its entirety and guided 
by the rule in the McNicols.' case, there is but one conclusion 
to be reached, and that is that Gough sustained his injury 
by assault as a natural incident of his work, and his evi-
dence taken at the hearing, which was not contradicted, can 
be contemplated by a reasonable person, familiar with the 
whole situation, that such assault directly arose out of his 
employm~nt, and that the· motive was for the sole purpose of 
obtaining possession of his automobile by force and violence. 
Section 57 of the Act contemplates the execution and filing 
of agreements for the payment of compensation, where it is 
apparent to the investigator and his company that the in-
. jury was by accident arising out of and in the 
page 59 ~ course of the employment. The facts with~n the 
knowledge of the company's representative were 
such a.s would justify the immediate submission of an agree-
ment for the payment of compensation, without the neces-
sity of a hearing. 
With the addition ·of the above, I concur in the opinion 
of Deans, Commissioner, rendered following the review of 
the above styled claim. 
page 60 ~ Nickels, Chairman, dissenting: 
It is my conclusion that the original :finding of fact of .May 
6, 1933, and award entered thereon on the same day are 
correct under all the facts and circumstances appearing in 
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page 61 } INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
Richmond 
NOTICE OF AWARD . 
. Claim No. 238-385 
Case of James S. Gough 
Date August 4, 1933. 
To Continental Life Insurance Company (Employer), Board 
of Trade Building, Norfolk, Virginia, and James S. Gough 
(Claimant), .216 W. 37th St., Norfolk, Virginia, and Aetna 
Life Insurance Company (Insur,ance Carrier), Richmond 
Virginia .. 
You are hereby notified that a. review was held before 
the full Commission at Richmond, Virginia, on June 15, 1933, 
in the above styled case and a decision rendered (Nickels, 
Chairman, dissenting) on August 4, 1933, setting 
page 62 } aside the decision of May 6, 1933, and the· award of 
the same date and directing an award in favor of 
the injured employee and providing for the payment of com-
pensation as follows: 
$14.oo·per week, beginning January 17,1933, payable every 
two weeks, during disability, and in addition payment of the 
-necessary medical, surgical and hospital attention, including 
the first 60 days and not to exceed an additional180 days. 
The employer will, therefore, make payment of compen-
sation as follows: 
To James S. Gough, $14.00 per week, payable- every two 
weeks, beginning January 17, 1933, and to continue until sub-
sequent conditions require a modification. All past due com-
pensation is to be paid· upon receipt of this award. 
To the proper parties the costs of all necessary medical, 
surgical and hospital attention incident to the in-
page 63 } jury for the first 60 days, and in addition the costs 
of all such necessary medical, surgical and hos-
pital attention not to exceed an additional 180 days under 
the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. 
44 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
To J. W. Eggleston, Attorney-at-Law, Norfolk, Virginia, 
the sum of One Hundred Seventy-five Dollars ($175.00) for 
professional services rendered the claimant, to be deducted 
from the compensation above awarded. 
The defendants will pay the costs in this proceeding. 
INDlTSTRIAL COl\1:1\IIISSION OF VIRGINIA, 
W.' H. NICKELS, JR., 
Chairman. 
Attest: 
W. F. BURSEY, 
- Secretary. 
pag~ ;64l I, W. F. Bursey, Secretary, Industrial Commis-
sion of Virginia, hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a' true and correct copy, as the same appears of record- in 
the :files of this office of &tatement of Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions: o~ Law· a'n,d~othe.r matters pertinent to the questions 
at issue in Claim No. 238-385-James S. Gough, Claimant~ 
vs. Qontinental Life Insurance Company, Employer and Aetna 
Life Insurance Company, Insurer. 
I further certify that counsel for Claimant had notice that 
-the Insurer would request certified copy of the record, in-
cluding the evidence, for the purpose of petitioning the 
Suprem~ Court of Appeals for a Writ of Error. 
It .is further certified that, as evidenced by U. S. Postal 
Regi~try Return Card, the Insure1·, on August 4, 1933, re-
ceiv~d copy of Award of the Industrial Commission of Vir-
gini~: dated ·August 4, 1933. 
Given· under my hand and the seal of the Industrial Com-
mission .of Virginia this the 28th day of August, 1933. 
(Seal) 
W. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
~- B. WATTS, C. C. 
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